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Reporters' Draft for the Working Group
on Federal-State Cooperation
by
HARRY LrrMAN* AND MARK D. GREENBERG**
I. Mechanisms of Cooperation and Communication
Having explored the theoretical underpinnings of federal court
jurisdiction, the Three-Branch Roundtable took up, as its final topic,
mechanisms for federal-state cooperation. Participants at the Confer-
ence repeatedly emphasized that the most important factor in ensur-
ing cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement
officials is close personal relationships between key players in each
jurisdiction. Although close personal relationships cannot be created
by fiat, they can be fostered by formal structures (such as the Three-
Branch Roundtable itself) that promote or reward cooperation.
The Conference considered four prominent mechanisms for fed-
eral-state cooperation within the executive branch: the Executive
Working Group of federal, state, and local prosecutors; Law Enforce-
ment Coordinating Committees; individual federal-state task forces;
and coordinated case targeting. Participants considered the effective-
ness of each of these mechanisms and discussed the factors responsi-
ble for the success of the more effective mechanisms. Turning from
executive branch mechanisms, the Conference closed with a brief con-
sideration of judicial and legislative cooperative mechanisms.
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A. The Executive Working Group
The Executive Working Group (EWG) operates at the national
level. It consists of representatives of the National Association of At-
torneys General, the National District Attorneys Association, the De-
partment of Justice, and various federal agencies. The group has
formal meetings at least biannually. These meetings, participants at
the Conference noted, serve to establish personal cooperative rela-
tionships among state, local, and federal prosecutors.
At the suggestion of the Attorney General, the EWG in 1992 cre-
ated a Task Force on Federal/State/Local Law Enforcement Coopera-
tion. The Task Force, which is chaired by Massachusetts Attorney
General Scott Harshbarger and includes United States Attorneys,
State Attorney Generals, and District Attorneys, was formed with the
explicit purpose of changing the "culture of noncooperation" among
federal, state, and local prosecutors.
In March 1994 the EWG Task Force issued a "Memorandum of
Cooperation" signed by the representatives of the highest levels of
federal, state, and local government, including members of the Task
Force, the Attorney General, the President of the National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General, and the President of the National District
Attorneys' Association. The Memorandum applies to prosecutors at
federal, state, and local levels of law enforcement and to federal agen-
cies under the authority of the Department of Justice. The Task Force
has further recommended that an executive order be issued that
would extend the policies articulated in the Memorandum to all fed-
eral agencies with prosecutorial and investigative functions.
The primary principles articulated in the Memorandum closely
parallel the priorities emphasized by the Conference. The Memoran-
dum lists five major policy goals: personal relationships between chief
prosecutors and investigators and their counterparts at other levels of
government; free exchange of information between coordinate law en-
forcement agencies; joint enforcement initiatives, or task forces, be-
tween law enforcement agencies; mechanisms for promptly resolving
disputes between federal and state law enforcement; and administra-
tive reporting requirements and financial incentive awards.
Recognizing the importance of structures that foster personal re-
lationships, the EWG Memorandum suggests requiring every new
chief prosecutor or investigator to hold an introductory meeting, and
subsequent quarterly meetings, to discuss common priorities and
problems, to delineate areas of possible cooperation, and to apprise
counterparts of ongoing cases that may be of interest to them. The
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Memorandum stresses that the chief prosecutors and investigators
should personally participate in these meetings; they also should en-
sure that regular meetings take place between corresponding key staff
members.
One obvious benefit of strong personal relationships between the
various levels of law enforcement is an increase in the flow of infor-
mation within the law enforcement community, which can both in-
crease the efficient use of limited law enforcement resources and stem
counterproductive competition between the agencies. The Memoran-
dum cites some impediments to the free flow of information: mistrust
between agencies, miscommunication or misuse of information, re-
sentment over incomplete reciprocity, and conflicting agency goals or
interests. To combat these impediments, the Memorandum recom-
mends a presumption in favor of sharing information. Specifically, the
Memorandum recommends that agency heads notify their counter-
parts in advance of relevant information in the following specific cir-
cumstances: when an agency is involved in an investigation that it
knows would be of interest to a coordinate office; when a prosecutor
is planning to take an action he or she knows or should know will have
a negative impact on a coordinate prosecutor; and when an agency
uses resources or personnel from another level of law enforcement.
Exceptions should be made only when there are "good faith and ar-
ticulated reasons" for not sharing information; for example, there is a
reasonable fear of a leak to the press that would have a negative im-
pact on the investigation.'
Conference participants agreed with the EWG Memorandum
that task forces are a concrete and effective mechanism for coopera-
tion among federal, state, and local prosecutors. This Report dis-
cusses task forces in Section I.C. below.
A strong theme of the Conference was the need to establish
mechanisms for the resolution of disputes between agency heads that
cannot be resolved within the cooperative structures themselves.
While again stressing the importance for avoiding such disputes of
strong personal relationships between agency heads, participants ac-
knowledged that situations will inevitably arise in which agency heads
cannot satisfactorily resolve disagreements. One possible mechanism
is a neutral mediator. The EWG Memorandum includes a recommen-
dation for a panel comprising officers from the Department of Justice,
NAAG, and NDAA. The panel would act as a fail-safe mechanism to
1. EWG Memorandum at 10-12.
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ensure that abiding substantive disagreements or communication
problems not undermine the overall working relationship. Mediation
by this panel would be at the option of the parties and would be avail-
able upon the request of any agency head who had already attempted
to resolve the conflict through the cooperative structure.
The Conference did not take up the topic of incentive systems,
but the EWG Memorandum proposes that agency heads create such
systems-incorporating both rewards and penalties-to promote co-
operation with other agencies. The Memorandum further proposes
that funding awards to agencies be tied in part to demonstrated coop-
erative efforts. The Memorandum's more specific recommendations
for incentive programs are that U.S. Attorneys be required to identify
their efforts to cooperate with state and local law enforcement agen-
cies; that the Department of Justice, in evaluating and determining
merit raises, take into account agencies' and officials' commitment to
cooperative law enforcement; and that Department of Justice grants
be used to support joint initiatives.
B. Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees
The second major mechanism for cooperation identified at the
Conference is the Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee, or
LECC. Although every federal district has an LECC, the structure
and scope of LECCs vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The
LECCs typically include representatives from federal, state, and local
prosecutorial and law enforcement offices, and many include private
individuals or members of non-law enforcement agencies. In some
cases, agency heads participate actively; at the other extreme, repre-
sentation in some LECCs is entirely at the staff level. The frequency
and subject matter of LECC meetings also vary widely from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, with the LECC playing little more than a ceremo-
nial function in some jurisdictions and serving as an active and
effective focus for cooperative ventures in others.
The LECC's most basic, and perhaps most important, function is
to provide a permanent, flexible mechanism for communication and
fence mending between different levels of government. Conference
participants recognized that, here as elsewhere, the success of cooper-
ative ventures depends heavily on the personalities and commitment
to cooperation of the heads of the agencies involved. For instance, it
was noted at the Conference that federal and local prosecutors in Los
Angeles had had little communication until the current District Attor-
ney personally called his federal counterpart. Nevertheless, even
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when agency heads do not make cooperation a priority, a structured
LECC can provide a continuing, if low proffle, link between offices.
Similarly, an LECC provides a stable line of communication that can
facilitate the resumption of cooperation after a change in personnel.
Finally, LECCs provide a natural mechanism for the establishment of
task forces on particular issues, either directly under the LECC's aegis
or as a byproduct of the interchange fostered within the LECC.
A comparison between Conference discussions of the EWG and
of the LECCs suggests that the EWG has been a more consistently
productive mechanism for cooperation than the LECCs, the effective-
ness of which has varied considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The EWG has been successful in formulating a flexible set of policy
guidelines for cooperative efforts and in providing a framework for
fostering personal relationships. The EWG has clearly defined goals,
a stable membership, and regularly scheduled, formal meetings at
least twice a year. Although structured, the EWG also has the flexi-
bility to attack specific issues by creating subcommittees, such as the
EWG Task Force on Federal/State/Local Cooperation, which report
to the larger group. In contrast, the membership, meeting frequency,
and scope of LECCs vary dramatically from district to district. The
Memorandum notes that LECCs might better serve the functions for
which they were created if their composition, structure, and proce-
dures were standardized. This standardization would enable the
LECCs to benefit from the kind of stability and continuity that has
contributed to the effectiveness of the EWG.
In general, the EWG Memorandum emphasizes that clear articu-
lation of the roles of participating agencies in every phase of a joint
venture promotes successful cooperation by avoiding misunderstand-
ings. The Memorandum's principles of cooperation provide a
blueprint for a cooperative enterprise that particular institutions can
tailor to their needs.
C. Task Forces
Many jurisdictions have established task forces to provide a coor-
dinated approach to specific law enforcement problems, such as
health care fraud or organized crime. Task forces can be established
under the auspices of a nationwide program, by an LECC, or simply
on the initiative of law enforcement officials motivated by common
concern about a pressing local problem. The task force brings to-
gether representatives of federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies to plan a coordinated strategy that will make efficient use of
April 1995] FEDERAI-STATE COOPERATION
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the expertise, resources, and legal tools available to different levels of
government. Conference participants noted that this kind of coopera-
tive approach serves to minimize discord and turf wars.
Task forces have resulted in more effective use of limited re-
sources, a reduction in duplication, and more rational and coherent
approaches to particular crime problems. The Memorandum suggests
a formal structure for task forces that would address some of the
traditional pitfalls of cooperative efforts by requiring the resolution of
central procedural matters prior to the formation of the task force.
These matters include identification of interested agencies; determina-
tion of the level of resources committed by each agency; designation
of participants; and establishment of mechanisms for resolving dis-
putes, dealing with the media, and sharing credit. The Memorandum
also urges task forces to develop guidelines to determine in individual
cases how federal, state, and local resources should be used and in
which jurisdiction a prosecution should be brought. These recommen-
dations apply to informal cooperative undertakings as well as to task
forces.
As the Conference discussion of task forces made clear, task
forces have implications for the broader issues of federal jurisdiction
that the Conference addressed. On the one hand, task forces can
bring more cases into the federal system in order to take advantage of
the stricter penalties and favorable procedures the federal system af-
fords. On the other, task forces can help reduce the federal caseload
by making federal expertise and resources available to state and local
counterparts. For example, cases often are brought in the federal sys-
tem in order to take advantage of federal investigative expertise and
federal victim- and witness-assistance programs. Through the opera-
tion of task forces, these federal resources can be made available to
state and local law enforcement officials, removing the need to bring
the cases federally. Task forces also can be used to train state and
local officials in areas of federal investigative expertise such as organ-
ized crime or environmental crime, thus reducing pressure on federal
resources and increasing effectiveness throughout the criminal justice
system.
D. Coordinated Case Targeting
Finally, the Conference considered the use of coordinated case
targeting as a means of promoting the most efficient use of limited law
enforcement resources. In coordinated case targeting, federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies join in cooperative efforts to tar-
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get certain types of cases or offenders for federal prosecution in order
to take advantage of stiffer federal penalties or favorable procedures.
Conference participants agreed that coordinated case targeting
has been a highly successful cooperative mechanism. The two most
noteworthy examples have been the Triggerlock program and the
Anti-Violence Initiative. The Triggerlock program targets violent ca-
reer offenders for prosecution under tough federal firearms statutes.
The program integrates state and local officials' knowledge of violent
career offenders with the availability of strict federal penalties. The
result is a more effective targeting and incarceration of violent career
offenders than federal and state forces could separately achieve. The
Triggerlock program has successfully targeted over 13,000 violent of-
fenders for federal prosecution since its inception in 1991.
The Conference also focused specifically on the DOJ Anti-Vio-
lence Initiative. This program makes broader and more flexible use of
federal, state, and local coordination than Triggerlock in targeting
communities' most violent repeat offenders. The core of the Initiative
is the creation within each jurisdiction of a working group consisting
of representatives of the United States Attorney's Office, the local
District Attorney's office, and investigative agencies on both the fed-
eral and state levels. Each working group makes its own determina-
tion of which violent crime problem or which particular offenders to
target. The group then considers how best to bring to bear the com-
bined federal, state, and local resources at its disposal.
Central to the operation of the Anti-Violence Initiative is the
idea of comparative advantage. For each aspect of the targeted prob-
lem, the working group considers whether the federal, state, or local
government has a comparative advantage in prosecutorial, investiga-
tive, or other criminal-justice resources. Although the comparative-
advantage analysis should be carried out on a case-by-case basis, some
generalizations may be drawn regarding the different comparative ad-
vantages of local and federal agencies. The vast majority of overall
law enforcement, judicial, and penological resources are at the state
and local levels. As the example of Triggerlock illustrates, state and
local law enforcement agencies typically have greater knowledge of
particular communities and access to street intelligence than do fed-
eral agencies. Local agencies also may have a better understanding of
which crime problems should be targeted for coordinated attack.
Federal advantages in resources and expertise typically include
inter-jurisdictional investigative capabilities, electronic eavesdropping
techniques, victim- and witness-assistance programs, and expertise in
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traditionally federal areas such as organized crime and environmental
crime. Federal legal advantages can include long sentences, favorable
procedural rules such as preventive detention, or far-reaching statu-
tory provisions (such as RICO or CCE). As one participant noted,
however, the comparative advantages of different levels of govern-
ment may vary according to the case. For example, the local govern-
ment will sometimes have the statutory advantage and be in the best
position to take the case to trial. Decisions on where the comparative
advantage lies in each targeted area and in each phase of the case are
made jointly by the working group members.
Participants discussed the factors that make for effective use of
the coordinated-case-targeting approach. Careful definition of the
targeted problem ensures that agency time and resources are not
wasted on problems, such as random street crime, that can be more
effectively addressed locally and that local agencies do not perceive
federal agencies to be invading their territory or cherry-picking cases.
A division of duties within the project according to the neutral princi-
ple of comparative advantage promotes efficiency and reduces strife.
For example, in Triggerlock, in accordance with the idea of compara-
tive advantage, local law enforcement agencies were entrusted with
the task of identifying and arresting the targeted violent repeat of-
fenders because local authorities had closer relations to the commu-
nity and greater access to street-level intelligence than federal law
enforcement officers. For prosecution, the comparative advantage
shifted to the federal agencies because federal law generally imposes
longer sentences for gun offenses than state law. Similarly, Attorney
General Reno cited as an example of a successful coordinated effort a
New Haven initiative in which the district working group successfully
used the intelligence information of the local agencies to identify the
major players in local gangs, and then prosecuted them under federal
statutes.
Conference participants noted that local agencies may be reluc-
tant to cooperate, fearing that federal agencies will control the opera-
tions and take the lion's share of the credit for them. Relatedly, local
agencies worry that cooperation with federal agencies will reinforce
the public perception that federal investigative and prosecutorial
agencies are superior to local agencies. Local law enforcement repre-
sentatives also expressed concern that relying on federal expertise in
entire areas of criminal investigation and prosecution will inhibit the
development of state expertise in these areas. These concerns can be
dealt with to some extent by providing local officials with increased
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access to federal training programs, by sharing information between
federal and local agencies, and by carefully structuring cooperative ef-
forts so that responsibility, resources, and credit are fairly
apportioned.
E. Judicial Branch
There are fewer mechanisms for judicial-branch cooperation than
for law enforcement cooperation, but conference participants noted
the advent of a few important mechanisms in recent years. In 1990
the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) had a fruitful meeting with the
Judicial Conference of the United States. This was the first and only
occasion on which these bodies have met in plenary joint session. The
meeting resulted in the establishment of the National Judicial Council,
composed of four federal judges designated by the Chief Justice and
four state chief justices designated by the President of the CCJ. The
Council meets semi-annually, most recently in March 1994. The par-
ticipants in the CCJ-Judicial Conference meeting also called attention
to the work of judicial councils of state and federal judges, which al-
ready exist in many states. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, all nine
states, Guam, and the Northern Marianas have state-federal judicial
councils that meet regularly to address substantive and procedural
matters of joint concern, such as habeas corpus. Other mechanisms
for state-federal judicial cooperation include the Committee on Fed-
eral State Jurisdiction of the Judicial Conference, which includes three
state chief justices, and the State Federal Relations Committee of the
CCJ, with two federal judges. Judicial cooperation is also fostered by
a variety of conferences, including the Orlando Conference of 1992,
the Northwest Conference of 1993, and the Mid-Atlantic Conference
of 1994.
Conference participants suggested that the judicial councils of
state and federal judges be put to greater use and their existence and
work be more widely publicized. Participants also pointed out that
the council also could serve as an informal conduit for dialogue be-
tween judges and the law enforcement community. A model for that
kind of ongoing dialogue already exists in the working group formed
by the Department of Justice and the Criminal Justice Committee of
the Judicial Conference. The working group, chaired by Judge Mary-
anne Trump Barry, has been effective in fostering communication on
issues of common concern to the federal judiciary and federal law en-
forcement, in particular the issues raised by the increased federal
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criminal jurisdiction resulting from the Violent Crime Control Act of
1994.
F. Legislative Branch
Conference participants remarked on the absence of formal
mechanisms for communication between state legislatures and either
Congress or federal law enforcement, and on the importance of pro-
moting such communication. To narrow the communication gap, Con-
ference participants recommended increasing the use and
dissemination of impact statements. The Governance Institute is cur-
rently studying the circumstances in which impact statements are use-
ful and feasible and the ways in which federal-state cooperation can
improve them. Conference participants also noted the importance of
improving communication between Congress and the federal execu-
tive branch with respect to federal policies affecting the states.
There are established avenues of communication between state
and local law enforcement and Congress. Organizations such as the
National District Attorneys' Association, the National Association of
Attorneys General, and the National Association of Police Officers
have a regular and strong influence on congressional action affecting
the interests of state and local law enforcement.
11. The Principled Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction
A principal aim of the Three-Branch Roundtable Conference was
to formulate principles to guide, and perhaps to stem, the increasing
federalization of the civil and criminal laws. The results of these ef-
forts are described in the Reports of the other three working groups.
But the federalization problem, at least in the criminal law, may in the
final analysis present itself primarily as an issue of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. The federal-state boundary in the criminal law is ever more
indistinct: Congress has created federal jurisdiction over a broad
range of criminal activity, and the span of the federal criminal law
seems likely to expand yet further in the 104th Congress.2 More and
more primary conduct, therefore, is subject to both federal and state
criminal prosecution. Compared with this dramatic growth in federal
criminal jurisdiction, federal prosecutorial resources remain relatively
constant, and in the aggregate a small fraction of state and local re-
2. See H.R. 3, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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sources.3 Thus, even as the federal government's reach continues to
grow, its grasp continues to be limited to approximately 35,000 actual
felony prosecutions per year, which means that upwards of 95 percent
of all prosecutions are handled locally. As a practical matter, there-
fore, the most pressing "federalization" issue becomes what principles
(if any) will guide the exercise of concurrent federal-state jurisdiction.
This issue surfaced repeatedly, but only in passing, in the Conference.
The working group on federal-state cooperation undertook to ex-
amine it more carefully and to set out for discussion some basic points
and principles.
A. Why Should There Be Principles for the Exercise of Concurrent
Jurisdiction?
Principles governing prosecutorial discretion avoid arbitrariness
and ensure that appropriate considerations guide the selection of
cases for federal prosecution. At the same time, United States Attor-
neys need flexibility to shape law enforcement strategies that will best
address local problems and concerns. For this reason, the content of
principles governing the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction should
consist of overarching general standards. Such principles can direct
prosecutorial decisions to take into account certain underlying values,
but are to be applied in the light of the specific circumstances of each
local community.
Principles for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction serve a
number of important values. First, such principles may be the only
real means to ensure that federalism values are taken into account.
Historically, the courts have looked out for federalism by scrutinizing
the source of Congress's authority to pass legislation. This constitu-
tional constraint is now effectively all but abandoned. In conse-
quence, federalism is left to congressional restraint and prosecutorial
discretion. Congressional restraint, however, is not a sufficiently
sturdy protection for federalism values. For one thing, Congress has
been increasingly unrestrained in federalizing crimes that are in the
public eye, and, as the new House Crime Bill illustrates, the trend is
not likely to reverse itself soon.4 It is nevertheless a good idea to de-
velop principles to guide Congress in enacting criminal legislation.
3. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1797 (1994) (creating many new federal crimes but authorizing only enough addi-
tional appropriations for fifty to a hundred new prosecutors).
4. See H.R. 3, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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But there is a reason why such principles cannot be framed too
narrowly.
Federal criminal jurisdiction cannot be limited to certain discrete,
specially federal areas of the law. A federal solution to a law enforce-
ment problem is needed when the states are not fully able to cope
with a specific aspect of a problem of national dimension, and the dis-
tinctive attributes of the federal government put it in a qualitatively
better position to handle this aspect of the problem. For example, a
sophisticated criminal enterprise may spread across numerous states
in a way that makes it difficult for any one state to investigate and
prosecute, or a crime may raise issues that are so sensitive locally that
the independence of the federal courts is needed. It is difficult, how-
ever, to draft a statute in a way that includes only those crimes that
are sophisticated, inter-jurisdictional, or sensitive enough to require a
federal solution. In order to allow sufficient flexibility to bring a fed-
eral prosecution when an aspect of a law enforcement problem re-
quires it, federal criminal legislation inevitably will have to be
somewhat overinclusive. It will have to be drafted in a way that in-
cludes criminal activities that state and local criminal justice systems
can handle, as well as activities that they cannot. Thus, principles gov-
erning prosecutorial discretion stand as the last frontier for the protec-
tion of federalism interests.
Principles for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction also serve
the goal of uniformity in the application of federal law. Although it is
not possible (and perhaps not even desirable) to eliminate all differ-
ences in the application of federal law in different federal jurisdic-
tions, uniformity is nevertheless a fundamental goal that promotes
fairness, predictability, and certainty. Other things being equal, fed-
eral law ought to treat like cases alike. There are, of course, reasons
for departing from this norm, but, without principles, the legal system
will depart from it arbitrarily. Even if Congress passes equal laws and
the courts apply them evenhandedly, uniformity in the application of
the law cannot be achieved without a principled exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. Especially as federal criminal jurisdiction ex-
pands, it is important that the Department strive to exercise its ex-
panding discretion in a principled way. Principles for the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction also help to ensure a fair and uniform alloca-
tion of federal resources, such as investigative resources, to states and
local communities.
Moreover, the federal courts are a limited resource, and the in-
crease in federal criminal legislation threatens to overwhelm their
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docket with criminal cases. Federal prosecutorial decisions have a
large impact on the business of the federal courts. Principles gov-
erning those decisions can therefore be a significant factor in protect-
ing the important functions of the federal courts.
Finally, principles governing prosecutorial discretion can help to
make federal law enforcement efforts effective. As a general matter,
the federal role in prosecuting crime, especially violent crime, is nec-
essarily secondary to that of local authorities because the vast major-
ity of criminal justice system resources are state and local. As noted
above, upwards of ninety-five percent of all prosecutions are handled
by state or local prosecutors. Thus, if federal efforts directed at vio-
lent crime are to have a meaningful impact, they must be selectively
targeted where they can best complement the efforts of local authori-
ties. Prosecutorial principles can guide such a discriminating use of
federal resources.
B. A Presumption of State Prosecution
Once the case has been made for development of principles to
govern the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, the next inquiry be-
comes what should be the content of such principles. A sensible first,
grounding principle, for at least the ordinary run of cases, is a pre-
sumption of prosecution in the state system. This is a sound organiz-
ing principle for a number of reasons. It is a tenet of our federal
union, supported by long practice and tradition, that the basic govern-
ance of day-to-day affairs, including criminal law, rests with the states.
Second, practical benefits flow from observation of this principle.
These include the opportunity for states to experiment with different
ways of dealing with crime. For example, the Violent Crime Control
Act of 1994 included provisions for special drug courts and a "three
strikes and you're out" federal penalty, both of which had been pio-
neered in state systems. Third, democratic values support allowing
different communities to make their own determinations about the
appropriate response to anti-social, criminal behavior. Relatedly,
state and local legislatures arguably are more directly accountable to
the people and therefore more likely to reflect the popular will in
their policy determinations.
It could be objected that Congress's passing a statute manifests a
choice to override these considerations. We are concerned, however,
with cases in which Congress has chosen to supplement, and not to
preempt, state law. The enactment of a federal statute simply demon-
strates that Congress thought there was a need to have a federal crimi-
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nal remedy available, not that Congress determined that the entire
area of law should be given over to federal regulation.5
The selective exercise of federal jurisdiction is an essential and
unavoidable incident of our criminal justice system, in which the states
conduct the great majority of all criminal prosecutions. Consider, for
example, the Hobbs Act. If federal prosecutors were not highly re-
strained in their exercise of prosecutorial discretion under the Hobbs
Act, which potentially criminalizes any convenience store holdup, the
criminal business of the federal courts would expand exponentially.
Congress thus understands that choices have to be made about which
subset of cases over which there is concurrent federal and state juris-
diction should be federally prosecuted. The federalism reasons that
state law should generally govern most conduct bear on those choices
as much as on legislative decisions.
Although there are reasons generally favoring state prosecution
in the run of cases, those reasons are not applicable in certain catego-
ries of cases. For those categories of cases, a presumption of state
prosecution is not appropriate. Furthermore, even when the pre-
sumption is applicable, it will be rebutted in particular cases when the
reasons generally favoring state prosecution are overridden by factors
specific to the circumstances.
C. The Conditions Under Which a Presumption of State Prosecution Is
Appropriate
In considering to which categories of cases the presumption of
state prosecution should apply, it is important to distinguish two
classes of federal interests. First, the federal government can have an
interest, such as prevention of violence, that is substantially shared by
the state. In such cases, although it is no doubt legitimate for Con-
gress to act to advance the federal interest (and for the Department of
Justice to make enforcement a priority), the presumption of state
prosecution probably should be applicable. All the theoretical and
practical reasons for safeguarding the primary role of the state system
apply. Since the state has substantially the same interest as the federal
government and since it is preferable, other things being equal, to rely
on state or local government, the best way to promote the federal in-
terest within the context of the federal system is to allow the state to
5. Cf. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) ("When Congress acts in an area traditionally
occupied by the States, federal legislation does not preempt state law unless that is the
'clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' ").
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vindicate that interest. If all goes well, the federal interest will be vin-
dicated without the federal government's having to intervene and
without burdening the federal courts. It is only when the presumption
is rebutted because, in the particular circumstances of a case, the state
cannot fully vindicate the common interest, that the federal govern-
ment should step in.
In contrast, some federal interests are distinctively federal, that is,
they are interests that the states do not share. Federal and state laws
may regulate the same conduct in order to serve different interests.
So, for example, a crime against a foreign government or national may
implicate the state's general interest in crime prevention, while the
federal government will have, in addition to the same general interest,
an interest derived from its special role in the protection of interna-
tional relations. Similarly, the conduct that constitutes a federal se-
curities crime will in many cases violate some state criminal law, but
that law will not be designed to vindicate the national interest in a
reliable and stable securities market.
In categories of cases in which there is a distinctively federal in-
terest, the presumption should not hold because it no longer stands to
reason that the state will be able to vindicate the federal interest. In-
deed, it could be argued that the presumption should be reversed, so
that unless, in the particular circumstances of a case, there are coun-
tervailing factors, a federal prosecution should be initiated. Since
Congress has, within its constitutional powers, determined that an in-
terest needs to be promoted and since that interest will not reliably be
advanced without a federal prosecution, practical and general federal-
ism reasons favoring state prosecution lose their force.
Crimes against foreign governments and securities crimes epito-
mize the types of offenses that implicate distinctively federal interests.
Closer cases are crimes occurring on federal property. Such crimes
implicate a federal interest that is different from the state's interest.
On the other hand, at least in general, the federal interest in such
cases is different from the state interest only in that it is the federal
government's property that happens to be involved. If we are earnest
about preserving states' control over the run of criminal prosecution,
the fact that a crime happens to occur on federal property may not by
itself give rise to a sufficiently distinct or intense federal interest to
make the presumption of state prosecution automatically inapplicable.
A better solution might be to leave the presumption in place and take
into account on a case-by-case basis the significance of any peculiarly
federal interest in considering whether the presumption is rebutted.
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In addition to having a special federal interest in certain kinds of
cases, the federal government also may have resource advantages in
particular classes of cases. For example, the federal government is
generally better positioned to investigate interstate crimes and gener-
ally more experienced in combatting sophisticated financial crimes.
Resource considerations, while they may serve to rebut the presump-
tion of state prosecution in individual cases, should not serve to re-
move or reverse the presumption for whole categories of cases. The
federal government has a potential resource advantage in many cate-
gories of cases. It is neither feasible nor desirable to prosecute feder-
ally most cases falling within those categories. Moreover, in many
cases, federal resources can be made available to the states for a state
prosecution (which has the additional advantage of facilitating the de-
velopment of expertise and investigative techniques within the states).
A principle that the presumption is removed for categories of cases in
which the federal government has a resource advantage therefore
seems too crude and sweeping a mechanism for dealing with resource
advantages. It is more sensible to consider case-by-case whether re-
source advantages rebut the presumption.
D. Rebutting the Presumption of State Prosecution
When the presumption of state prosecution applies, the pivotal
determination becomes whether it is rebutted in the individual cir-
cumstances of the case. This Section considers some of the factors
relevant to that determination.
One factor to be considered is whether the state is unlikely to be
committed to vindication of the shared state and federal interest. For
example, in a case involving the rights of an insular and unpopular
minority, there might be reason to fear a lack of resolve to protect
those rights on the part of state actors. However, it seems inappropri-
ate and destructive of state-federal relations to assume that a state will
not act in good faith in exercising its prosecutorial discretion. Only
when there is strong and concrete evidence that the state will not seek
to vindicate the shared state and federal interests should the presump-
tion be rebutted. In other cases, the federal government would do
better to rely on the Petite policy, which governs dual or successive
prosecutions following a state trial, to protect its interests. Under this
approach, a federal prosecution would not be brought in the first in-
stance merely because there was some reason to doubt state willing-
ness fully to protect the common state and federal interest; if the state
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prosecution failed to vindicate the federal interest, however, federal
charges could be entertained under the Petite policy.
As discussed in the last Section, resource advantages of the fed-
eral government may sometimes be relevant in deciding whether the
presumption of state prosecution is rebutted. Examples include inves-
tigative resources (particularly for inter-jurisdictional investigations),
investigative expertise or techniques, or special federal programs such
as the witness-protection program. But the argument that the pre-
sumption generally should apply notwithstanding a federal resource
advantage for a category of cases is relevant to the rebuttal of the
presumption as well. In general, a federal resource advantage is not,
without more, a compelling reason to overcome the presumption.
This is particularly so since, despite the overall scarcity of federal re-
sources, federal resource advantages could be used as a justification
for rebutting the presumption in the majority of cases of concurrent
jurisdiction. Rather, where the federal government has resource ad-
vantages, the preferred strategy should be to make its resources avail-
able to the states for their use in state investigations and prosecutions.
This approach-combining federal resources with state prosecu-
tions-maximizes the effectiveness of federal resources, helps the
states develop technical and investigative expertise, and maintains the
prosecutorial function in the hands of the more closely accountable
sovereign.
Another possibly relevant factor is the possible availability of
legal advantages in the federal system. The most noteworthy of these
is longer sentences for certain crimes, particularly firearm and drug
offenses. Again, however, if the presumption of state prosecution is to
be meaningful, it cannot be rebutted simply by the potential availabil-
ity of a longer federal sentence. This advantage, after all, will exist in
a significant percentage of cases, far more than could be prosecuted
federally. Thus, if a set of principles for the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction justified federal prosecution merely because of the poten-
tial for a longer sentence in the federal system, a choice would still
have to be made whether to bring a federal prosecution. Since the
presumption would already be rebutted, the choice would be made
without consideration of the federalism values favoring state prosecu-
tion. Moreover, prosecuting federally merely because a stiffer sen-
tence is available is dubious as a matter of principle: local legislatures
determine the degree of punishment they believe is appropriate for a
given crime, and if they have set a punishment lower than that pro-
vided by the federal system, it is problematic to override that judg-
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ment by imposing federal penalties on a wholesale basis for that
crime. (This point presumes, of course, that the federal and state in-
terests are essentially the same; otherwise, the presumption of state
prosecution does not apply in the first place.) The state retains the
power to make its sentences as long or longer than those provided in
the federal system, as indeed many states are now doing. Other kinds
of legal advantages, such as the availability of preventive detention,
the possibility in some cases of a longer statute of limitations, and po-
tential advantages in jurisdiction or venue, present similar issues to
longer sentences, though allowing such advantages to rebut the pre-
sumption does not threaten to narrow the effective scope of the pre-
sumption as severely.
In sum, neither federal resource advantages nor federal legal ad-
vantages should themselves be sufficient to defeat the presumption of
state prosecution. In order for the presumption to have force, and to
serve the interests that give rise to it, a more particularized reason
should be required. The most obvious reason would be a specific na-
tionwide initiative that represents a policy choice selectively to use
federal resources to target certain offenses, such as carjacking, or cer-
tain offenders, such as repeat violent offenders. The Department's
Triggerlock program is an example of such a nationwide initiative.
Along similar lines, federal law enforcement, in conjunction with state
and local law enforcement, may identify an important local problem
that can be attacked by discriminating use of federal resources; for
example, an emerging gang problem may be uprooted by targeting a
small handful of leaders for federal prosecution. The Department's
Anti-Violence Initiative applies this kind of strategy at the national
level, seeking to identify within each community a particular problem
that can be addressed through the selective deployment of federal
legal or resource advantages. In contrast to the fact of longer federal
sentences, which applies generally to every case falling under the rele-
vant statute, specific national initiatives provide a principled basis for
deciding which cases should be prosecuted. Moreover, an initiative
manifests a particularized policy choice to use federal resources in a
certain way (unlike the mere enactment of a federal statute providing
for concurrent jurisdiction), thus counterbalancing general federalism
concerns. The initiatives also may take into account federalism val-
ues by providing for federal-state cooperation.
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E. Implementation of Principles
A detailed consideration of how these principles might be imple-
mented is outside the scope of this Report. Nevertheless, it is worth
considering a few basic questions of implementation. A first question
is who should implement the principles of concurrent jurisdiction:
who is best suited to make the determination whether the presump-
tion of state prosecution is not applicable or whether it has been over-
come in a particular case? The most sensible answer to the question
seems to be that since these principles are intended to guide federal
prosecutors in deciding whether to exercise federal jurisdiction, it
should be federal prosecutors, with input from their local colleagues,
who should implement the principles in the individual case, under the
guidance and direction of the Department of Justice. This conclusion
in turn suggests an answer to another important question of imple-
mentation, which is what form the principles should take. The princi-
ples would most naturally be adopted as part of the U.S. Attorneys'
Manual's exposition of Guidelines of Federal Prosecution, which
could be achieved by issuance of a bluesheet from the Attorney Gen-
eral, and applied in individual cases by federal prosecutors. Such a
regime of general DOJ guidance and application in the particular case
by individual AUSAs should not fence out state and local prosecutors
from the process. The principles should provide, among other things,
for regular interaction and consultation with state and local prosecu-
tors. Moreover, through the mechanisms for cooperation outlined
above, the federal, state, and local participants should hold regular
meetings at which they can monitor whether the principles are being
effectively implemented.
Another basic question of implementation is what should happen
when the state decides not to prosecute, or when it specifically re-
quests that the federal government take the case. Such a decision or
request should weigh in favor of federal prosecution. The federalism
interests that underlie the presumption of state prosecution are sub-
stantially weaker where the state asserts no interest in going forward.
The principles therefore could treat the state's declination as an im-
portant factor in favor of the presumption's rebuttal. But it should be
noted that some of the reasons for implementing a presumption of
state prosecution still may apply when the state has declined to prose-
cute, and particularly when the state not only has declined to prose-
cute but also has requested that the federal government do so. In
such circumstances, the interests in conservation of limited federal re-
sources and in promoting the accountability of the state and local sys-
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tern support resisting efforts to turn prosecutions over to the federal
system. In any event, particularly in politically controversial cases, a
cornerstone should be consultation among federal, state, and local
prosecutors, with the goal of reaching a prosecutorial decision that is
principled and fair.
